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Twin Peaks

FINANCIAL REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH
AFRICA: THE MOVE TOWARDS TWIN PEAKS
ANDREW SCHMULOW*

I INTRODUCTION

The Twin Peaks model of financial system regulation calls for the establishment of
two, independent, peak regulatory bodies. One charged with ensuring safety and
soundness in the financial system, the other with preventing market misconduct and
the abuse of consumers in the financial sector.
For reasons discussed elsewhere, 1 of the four models of financial system
regulation,2 Twin Peaks is regarded as best suited to this task.
The Twin Peaks model in general, and the Australian version of Twin Peaks in
particular, is currently undergoing implementation in South Africa. This article
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A. D. Schmulow, ‘Twin Peaks: A Theoretical Analysis’, in The Centre For International Finance

and Regulation (CIFR) Research Working Paper Series, no. 064/2015 / Project No. E018, The Centre
For International Finance and Regulation (CIFR), (1 July, 2015).
2

See: A.D Schmulow, ‘Approaches to Financial System Regulation: An International Comparative

Survey’, in The Centre For International Finance and Regulation (CIFR) Research Working Paper
Series, no. 053/2015 / Project No. E018, The Centre For International Finance and Regulation (CIFR),
(January, 2015).
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explores issues related to that implementation from the perspective of governance, as
it is employed in Australia. The article commences with a discussion and an analysis
of the historical development of Twin Peaks, followed by a discussion of governance.
Next is an analysis of key differences between Twin Peaks in Australia and Twin
Peaks as it is to be employed in South Africa. Finally there are concluding
observations.
The article does not canvass the regulatory architecture of Twin Peaks, as this
has been done elsewhere,3 as have discussions on the need for, and importance of,
inter-agency co-operation4 in Twin Peaks.

II

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The historical development of Twin Peaks provides an insight into its aims, which
were principally a response to the phenomenon of the ‘blurring of the boundaries’
taking place between traditional financial firms in the United Kingdom. The model,
which was first proposed by Michael Taylor in a pamphlet published by Centre for
the Study of Financial Innovation in 1994, 5 was aimed, primarily, at the Bank of
England. Australia was, however, the first country to adopt this model – a model
which is now increasingly being emulated across the globe.

A. The UK

Prior to the advent of Twin Peaks, the UK’s different overseers for conduct and
systemic issues in the financial sector were so numerous, that it was described as an

3

A. D. Schmulow, supra note 2; A. D. Schmulow, ‘The four methods of financial system regulation:

An international comparative survey’, 26 (3) Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice
(November, 2015).
4

A. J. Godwin & A. D. Schmulow, ‘The Financial Sector Regulation Bill In South Africa: Lessons

From Australia’, 132 (4) South African Law Journal (2015).
5

A. Hilton, ‘UK financial supervision: a blueprint for change’, in Centre for the Study of Financial

Innovation Working Paper, no. 6, Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, (May, 1994).
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‘alphabet soup’6 of regulators. Taylor argued at the time that those arrangements led
to conflicts of interest, ‘confusion and damage’.7
Britain’s system for regulating financial services, as was once said of its Empire,
has been acquired in a fit of absence of mind.8

The UK had a Byzantine system of disparate regulators, with each being
assigned a jurisdiction defined by the type of entity being regulated.
Contemporaneously, the financial system was increasingly experiencing a ‘blurring of
the boundaries’ between different kinds of financial institutions. Banks were
combining with insurers, and investment banks with stockbroking firms. Added to
this was the presence of large, systemically important building societies.9
The combination of these factors was identified as necessitating an overarching financial services regulator, the purpose of which would be to ensure the
stability of the financial system.10
This idea – one, combined financial services regulator - became the first half
of a more substantial proposal – ‘Twin Peaks’. Taylor11 argued for a fusion of the
multiple regulators then in existence - regulators charged with banking, securities,
insurance, and investment management. These regulators included the Bank of
England, the Building Societies Commission, 12 and the Securities and Investments
Board (SIB).13
Under Taylor’s plan, a new financial services regulator would henceforth
assume authority for all deposit-taking institutions14 and, crucially, would no longer
simply enforce bank regulations against individual transactions. It would be charged
with ensuring the overall stability of the financial system, by regulating bank capital
and the control of risk.15
6

M. W. Taylor, ‘“Twin Peaks”: A regulatory structure for the new century’, no. 20, Centre for the

Study of Financial Innovation, (December, 1995), 7.
7

Ibid., 1/3.

8

Ibid., 2.

9

Ibid., 4.

10

Ibid., 1.

11

A. Hilton, supra note 5.

12

M. W. Taylor, supra note 6, 3.

13

A. Hilton, supra note 5, 2.

14

M. W. Taylor, supra note 6, 4.

15

Ibid., 1.
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Specifically, Taylor envisaged that the bank regulator would address ‘financial
soundness of institutions – including capital adequacy and large exposure
requirements, measures relating to systems, controls and provisioning policies, and
the vetting of senior managers to ensure that they possessed an appropriate level of
experience and skill.’ 16 The collapse of Barings Bank 17 in 1995 provided further
impetus18 for the adoption of a single bank regulator.
Under Taylor’s proposal a second regulator would then be created, charged
with protecting consumers from unscrupulous operators: a market conduct and
consumer protection regulator, 19 the remit of which would be to ensure that
consumers were treated fairly and honestly, 20 by protecting them against ‘fraud,
incompetence, or the abuse of market power.’21 Measures would include restrictions
on the advertising, marketing and sale of financial products, as well as minimum fit
and proper standards for salespeople. 22 In the event of conflict between the two
regulators, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would provide a resolution.
According to Taylor,23 this would address four issues simultaneously:
i.

that henceforth a wide range of financial firms would have to be
regarded as systemically important;

ii.

that sprawling and disparate regulatory agencies be regarded as
presenting opportunities for regulatory arbitrage,24 and turf battles over
jurisdiction;25

16

Ibid., 3.

17

For more on this see: S. Fay, The Collapse of Barings, W. W. Norton & Co, (1997); A. Tickell,

‘Making a melodrama out of a crisis: reinterpreting the collapse of Barings Bank’, 14 (1) Environment
and Planning D: Society and Space (1996); and for a critical theory analysis: A. D. Brown, ‘Making
sense of the collapse of Barings Bank’, 58 (12) Human Relations (2005).
18

M. W. Taylor, supra note 6, 2.

19

Ibid., 1.

20

Ibid., 1.

21

Ibid., 3.

22

Ibid., 3.

23

Ibid., 4.

24

And ibid., 7: ‘[the same phenomenon that creates the potential for regulatory arbitrage also creates

the possibility for] important issues to ‘disappear down the gaps’, and … among consumers [confusion
is created] by an ‘“alphabet soup” of regulatory bodies’. See also: D. T. Llewellyn, ‘Institutional
Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues’, Paper presented at the World
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iii.

that in the ever increasing cases of financial conglomerates, a groupwide perspective on financial soundness would be addressed;26 and

iv.

that rare and specialist expertise and limited supervisory resources
would be pooled, instead of duplicated by overlapping.

The benefits of Twin Peaks are clear. The proposed structure would eliminate
regulatory duplication and overlap; it would create regulatory bodies with a
clear and precise remit; it would establish mechanisms for resolving conflicts
between the objectives of financial services regulation; and it would encourage a
regulatory process which is open, transparent and publically accountable.27

These examples show why structure does, and should matter, if we wish to create
an efficient, effective system of financial services regulation.28

While Llewellyn29 takes a contrary view, arguing that specialist agencies are
easier to hold to their objectives, in Australia the failures that have occurred under
each of the two, integrated regulators, have not been due to confusion over
objectives. 30 Rather, they have been due to a weak enforcement culture which has
Bank seminar Aligning Supervisory Structures with Country Needs, Washington, DC, (6th and 7th June
2006), 10, (§ 1).
25

M. W. Taylor, supra note 6, 11.

26

Ibid., 5, Taylor discusses the issue of psychological contagion, that is to say a collapse in depositor

confidence, not because an entity is directly involved in a loss, but because another entity – a
subsidiary – another part of the same conglomerate, is involved in a loss. This possibility - that retail
depositor panic can set-off a bank run across all associated entities - underscores the importance of a
whole-of entity approach to regulation. See also: D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24, 9.
27

M. W. Taylor, supra note 6, 1. See also D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24, 28.

28

M. W. Taylor, ‘Peak Practice: How to reform the UK’s regulatory system’, no. 23, Centre for the

Study of Financial Innovation, (October, 1996), 17.
29
30

D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24, 26.
See further, P. McConnell, ‘War on banking’s rotten culture must include regulators’, The

Conversation, (4 June, 2015 2.14pm AEST), http://theconversation.com/war-on-bankings-rottenculture-must-include-regulators-42767; M. Williams, ‘APRA and ASIC need cultural shift’, AsiaPacific

Banking

and

Finance,

(9

March,

2015),

https://www.australianbankingfinance.com/banking/apra-and-asic-need-cultural-shift/; A. Schmulow,
‘To clean up the financial system we need to watch the watchers’, The Conversation, (4 March, 2015
2.11 pm AEDT), http://theconversation.com/to-clean-up-the-financial-system-we-need-to-watch-the-
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bedevilled especially the market conduct and consumer protection peak, and to which
this article will return.
Similarly, Llewellyn argues that integrated agencies are more likely to suffer
reputational harm, due to the failures of one particular division within the agency and,
as a result, consumer confidence in the regulator may be weakened.31 This argument
does comport with the Australian experience, in relation to the manner in which the
market conduct and consumer protection agency has handled an on-going series of
financial advice scandals.32

B. Australia33
The ‘Twin Peaks’ model was proposed by, and implemented on, the conclusion of the
Wallis Commission of Inquiry in 1997.34 In the case of the prudential regulator (PA),
this replaced eleven separate regulators. 35 To wit, Australia separated the market
conduct and consumer protection authority – the Australian Securities and Investment
Commission (ASIC) – from the bank regulator – the Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority (APRA) – and the National Central Bank (NCB) – the Reserve Bank of
Australia (RBA).36 Crucially, APRA is not a division of the RBA, whereas in other

watchers-38359; A. Ferguson, ‘Hearing into ASIC’s failure to investigate CBA’s Financial Wisdom’,
The Sydney Morning Herald, (3 June, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/business/hearing-into-asicsfailure-to-investigate-cbas-financial-wisdom-20140602-39ept.html; P. McConnell, ‘ASIC’s Fashion
Faux-Pas’, The Conversation, (13 July, 2015 4.25pm AEST), https://theconversation.com/asicsfashion-faux-pas-44590.
31

See for example his remarks at: D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24, 28.

32

For more on this see: A. D. Schmulow, supra note 1, 43ff.

33

Elements of this section appeared in substantial part in a previous article, published as a working

paper by the Centre for International Finance and Regulation: A. D. Schmulow, supra note 2, 40ff.
34

S. Wallis, B. Beerworth, J. Carmichael, I. Harper & L. Nicholls, Financial System Inquiry, The

Treasury, (31 March, 1997). See also: J. Black, ‘Managing Regulatory Risks and Defining the
Parameters of Blame: A Focus on the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’, 28 (1) Law &
Policy (January, 2006), 4/5.
35

J. Black, ibid., 5.

36

Also created was the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). If the ACCC is to

be included, then the Australian model is in fact a ‘quad peak’ model. D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24,
17.
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jurisdictions that have adopted Twin Peaks, the PA has been incorporated as a
division of the NCB, and this is the arrangement envisaged for South Africa.37
Under Twin Peaks, the RBA is tasked with, inter alia, overall responsibility
for the financial system, and as lender of last resort (LLR).38 The Australian model
could, therefore, reasonably have been described as a three-peak model, with each
peak created as an independent, statutory body.39
In respect of governance, in 1999 APRA moved to a risk-based approach to
supervision.40 In 200241 APRA codified its risk-based approach to financial regulation
with the introduction of the ‘probability and impact rating system’ (PAIRS),42 and the
‘supervisory oversight and response system’ (SOARS).43
PAIRS is a framework for assessing how ‘risky’ an institution is vis-à-vis
APRA’s objectives; SOARS determines how officials respond to that risk.44 While
PAIRS examines a number of internal risk indices,45 a glaring omission is its failure to
provide a formal assessment of industry-wide risks,46 which are particularly germane
in an industry susceptible to contagion.

37

A. J. Godwin & A. D. Schmulow, supra note 4, 758.

38

John Trowbridge, ‘The Regulatory Environment - A Brief Tour’, Paper presented at the National

Insurance Brokers Association (NIBA) Conference, Sydney, NSW, (22 September 2009), Table, 2.
39

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act (Cth), No. 51 of 2001, (Australia); Australian

Prudential Regulation Authority Act (Cth), No. 50 of 1998, (Australia); Reserve Bank Act (Cth), No. 4
of 1959, (Australia). Independence in this context is a term of art describing the relationship between
the two peaks. It is not meant to describe the relationship between the peaks and government; in that
respect their independence is heavily limited. APRA, for example, is subject to limited direction from
the Minister: s 12, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act (Cth), No. 50 of 1998.
40

J. Black, supra note 34, 5/6.

41

Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Probability and Impact Rating System, Australian

Prudential

Regulation

Authority,

(June,

2012),

http://www.apra.gov.au/CrossIndustry/Documents/PAIRS-062012-External-version.pdf, 5.
42

For more, see: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Supervision’, in About APRA, published

by

Australian

Prudential

Regulation

Authority,

(undated),

accessed:

31

July,

http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutApra/Pages/Supervision.aspx; J. Black, supra note 34, 10ff.
43

J. Black, supra note 34, 8ff.

44

Ibid., 8.

45

See: ibid., 11.

46

Ibid.
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PAIRS differentiates the risk profile of regulated institutions into five
categories: low, lower medium, upper medium, high, and extreme.47 A similar system
was used in the UK prior to the global financial crisis (GFC) and the ensuing collapse
of Royal Bank of Scotland. As a result the efficacy of this ratings matrix is
questionable. In evaluating the ratings system used to assess the riskiness of Royal
Bank of Scotland, Hosking states:

The report is a blizzard of acronyms and bogus science: RBS was scored as a
“medium high minus”[48] risk, whatever that is …49

A key aspect of PAIRS is that it works on a multiplier not a linear scale.50 This
results in a higher SOARS scale, which in turn, it is argued, compels a more
aggressive supervisory response.51
In terms of the potential impact that a regulated entity might have on the
financial system, these is divided into four categories: low, medium, high and
extreme.52 This rating is determined relative to the regulated entity’s total Australian
resident assets, ‘subject to a management override that can raise or lower the impact
depending on senior management’s assessment’.53 In this regard Black asserts that:

47

Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Probability and Impact Rating System, Chapter 8 -

Probability of failure’, in About APRA, Probability and Impact Rating System, published by Australian
Prudential

Regulation

Authority,

(June

2012),

accessed:

5

August,

2015,

http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/PAIRS-1206-HTML.aspx.
48

For details on this rating, see: Financial Services Authority, ‘The failure of the Royal Bank of

Scotland’, in Financial Services Authority Board Report, Part 2, Chap. 3, Financial Services Authority,
(December, 2011), 260, (§ 683).
49

P. Hosking, ‘More lever-arch files wouldn’t have saved RBS’, The Times, (Morning ed., Tuesday, 13

December, 2013).
50

J. Black, supra note 34, 12.

51

Ibid.

52

Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Probability and Impact Rating System, Chapter 9 -

Impact of failure’, in About APRA, Probability and Impact Rating System, published by Australian
Prudential

Regulation

Authority,

(June

2012),

accessed:

http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/PAIRS-1206-HTML.aspx.
53

J. Black, supra note 34, 13.
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There was little science involved in determining the dividing lines between the
ratings, it was more a question of whether the overall result seemed to make
sense …54

What this flexibility belies, however, is a lack of coherent methodology.
Rather, reliance is made on intuition and supposition. There is, however, a wealth of
evidence from psychology that ‘gut instincts’ are frequently unreliable.55 Evidence of
the failure of this approach is to be found in the rogue trading scandal at National
Australia Bank, which resulted in losses of $360 million to the bank, and which
APRA ascribed to ‘cultural issues’.56

C. The Netherlands57

The Kingdom of the Netherlands was second to adopt a Twin Peaks approach in
2002,58 retaining prudential supervision within De Nederlandsche Bank NV 59 (‘The
Dutch Bank’ (DNB)). This is similar to the arrangement in the UK, but distinct from
Australia, where, as mentioned previously, the prudential regulator (APRA) is
separate from the NCB.
54

Ibid.

55

See for example the work of Kahneman, 2002 Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences, in: D.

Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 1st ed., Farrar, Straus and Giroux, (2011).
56

Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Report into Irregular Currency Options Trading at the

National Australia Bank’, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, (23 March, 2004), 6.
57

Elements of this section appeared in a previous article, published as a working paper by the Centre

for International Finance and Regulation: A. D. Schmulow, supra note 2, 33ff.
58

International Monetary Fund, ‘Kingdom of the Netherlands-Netherlands: Publication of Financial

Sector Assessment Program Documentation—Technical Note on Financial Sector Supervision: The
Twin Peaks Model’, in Financial Sector Assessment Program Update, IMF Country Report No.
11/208, International Monetary Fund, (July, 2011), Table 1, 6. See also: H. Prast & I. van Lelyveld,
‘New Architectures in the Regulation and Supervision of Financial Markets and Institutions: The
Netherlands’, in DNB Working Paper, no. 021/2004, De Nederlandsche Bank, (21 December, 2004).
59

De Nederlandsche Bank, ‘DNB Supervisory Strategy 2010 – 2014’, in Supra-institutional

perspective, strategy and culture, De Nederlandsche Bank, (April, 2010), 21; E. Wymeersch, ‘The
Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and
Multiple Financial Supervisors’, 8 (2) European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) (June,
2007), 16.
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The Dutch copied the Australian approach, particularly as it applied to
supervisory strategy - PAIRS and SOARS - both of which the Dutch regulator, the
DNB, adopted.60
While the Netherlands, under a Twin Peaks regime, managed to stave-off the
worst of the GFC, success for the Dutch authorities in an economy with such an
important financial sector was not achieved without ‘drastic’

61

government

intervention.62

Total foreign claims of Dutch banks amounted to over 300% of GDP. The Dutch
financial system therefore depended heavily on external developments. Only the
Belgian and Irish banking sectors were in a similar position. The European
average was less than half the Dutch figure at 135% of GDP … exposure of
Dutch banks to the United States also was the highest in Europe, at 66% of GDP
… whereas the average of European banks had kept limited exposure of less
than 30% of GDP. By contrast, the exposure of Dutch banks to hard-hit Eastern
European countries was at 11% of GDP just above the European average of 8%
of GDP.63

Intervention during the crisis took the form of measures to stimulate
employment through construction and housing (€ 6 billion); capital injections for
banks and insurers (€ 20 billion); state guarantees for banks (€ 200 billion); a
guarantee on all deposits up to €100,000;64 the nationalisation of Fortis/ABN AMRO
(€ 16.8 billion) and ING banking group (€ 10 billion) (comprising eighty-five per cent

60

J. Black, ‘Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategies’, Chap. 8, in The Oxford Handbook of

Financial Regulation, edited by N. Moloney, E. Ferran & J. Payne, Oxford University Press, (August,
2015), p 262.
61

De Nederlandsche Bank, ‘Annual Report 2009’, De Nederlandsche Bank NV, (24 March, 2010), 37,

and Chart, 45.
62

See further: J. Black, supra note 60, 47, (fn 128).

63

M. Masselink & P. van den Noord, ‘The Global Financial Crisis and its effects on the Netherlands’,

6 (10) ECFIN (Economic analysis from the European Commission’s Directorate-General for
Economic and Financial Affairs) Country Focus (4 December, 2009), 3.
64

Ministry of Finance, Government of the Netherlands, ‘The Netherlands and the credit crisis’, in

Financial Policy, published by Ministry of General Affairs, (undated), accessed: 11 January, 2015.
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of the Dutch banking sector65), and the SNS REAAL insurance and banking group (€
3.7 billion);66 and a reform of the financial system and the capital levels that had been
enforced to date. Thereafter the Dutch government was compelled to drastically
reduce spending in order to reduce its deficit.67
In the aftermath of the crisis, the conclusions reached about the performance
of the Dutch regulators were less than positive:

Both in the run-up to and during the credit crisis, supervisory instruments fell
short in several areas. These deficiencies emerged in both the scope and the
substance of supervision. The trend towards lighter supervision, reflecting
developments within the financial sector as well as changed social attitudes,
[had] gone too far.68

This finding supports the conclusions reached in the analysis of the
performance of the UK regulatory authorities during the GFC, namely that regulatory
architecture alone is not a panacea against financial crises. Doubtless regulatory
architecture is part of the solution, but no more so than the capacity of the regulators
to foresee, at times, the unforeseeable,69 and regulate accordingly; and the willingness
of the regulators to enforce their regulations.

D. South Africa

For South Africa the problem of the current regulatory structure was highlighted, with
a degree of disapproval, by the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) Report,
65

M. Van Oyen, ‘Ringfencing or Splitting Banks: A Case Study on The Netherlands’, 19 (1) The

Columbia Journal of European Law Online (Summer 2012), 6.
66

T. Escritt & A. Deutsch, ‘Netherlands nationalizes SNS Reaal at cost of $5 billion’, Reuters, United

States ed., (Friday, 1 February, 2013, 6:30 am).
67
68

Ministry of Finance, Government of the Netherlands, supra note 64.
De Nederlandsche Bank, ‘DNB Supervisory Strategy 2010 - 2014 and Themes 2010’, De

Nederlandsche Bank, (April, 2010), 5.
69

See for example: M. Douglas & A. Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of

Technological and Environmental Dangers, revised ed., University of California Press, (1983), p 1,
where the authors state: ‘Can we know the risks we face, now or in the future? No, we cannot; but yes,
we must act as if we do.’
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conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in
2008.70 As a result, the National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa, in its 2011
Report, 71 identified financial regulatory reform as a necessity, and committed the
Republic to adopting a Twin Peaks model of financial regulation,72 modelled broadly
on that currently in use in Australia.
Historically South Africa had adopted an institutional approach in which
banks, insurers and capital markets were regarded as separate species.73 Regulation
was typified by a lack of co-ordination.74
The 1987 de Kock Commission Report, chaired by Dr Gerhardus de Kock,
later Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, reformed the regulatory system in
South Africa, and implemented a functional financial regulatory approach.75
While the 1993 the Melamet Commission, chaired by Judge David Melamet,
recommended a single regulator, the regulatory system has remained functional and
partially integrated.76 Currently the financial system is regulated by the South African
Reserve Bank (SARB) 77 and the Financial Services Board (FSB). 78 The FSB is a
statutory body charged with the task of overseeing the non-bank financial industry
(NBFI),79 which in turn is currently covered by twelve separate pieces of legislation
plus its own enabling Act.80 In respect of NBFIs, the FSB has a market abuse remit,
70

S. Kal Wajid, ‘South Africa: Financial System Stability Assessment, Including Report on the

Observance of Standards and Codes on the following topic: Securities Regulation’, in Financial System
Stability Assessment, no. 08/349, International Monetary Fund, (October, 2008).
71

Republic of South Africa National Treasury, ‘A safer financial sector to serve South Africa better’,

in National Treasury Policy Document, National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, (23 February,
2011).
72

Ibid., 5.

73

D. Rajendaran, ‘Approaches to Financial Regulation and the case of South Africa’, IFMR Finance

Foundation (6 March, 2012).
74

Ibid.

75

Ibid.

76

Ibid.

77

South African Reserve Bank Act, No. 90 of 1989, (Republic of South Africa).

78

Financial Services Board Act, No. 97 of 1990, (Republic of South Africa).

79

Financial Services Board, ‘Welcome to the FSB’, in About Us, published by Financial Services

Board, (1996-2013), accessed: 17 August, 2014, https://www.fsb.co.za/aboutUs/Pages/default.aspx.
80

Collective Investment Schemes Control Act, No. 45 of 2002, (Republic of South Africa); Credit

Rating Services Act, No. 24 of 2002, (Republic of South Africa); Financial Advisory and
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carried out by the Directorate of Market Abuse (DMA).81 Market abuse in terms of
the Financial Markets Act consists of insider trading, 82 market manipulation, 83 and
false reporting.84
The prohibitions against market abuse, the Directorate’s powers to investigate,
and the administrative sanctions and penalties which the Directorate may bring to
bear are set out in Chapter X85 of the Financial Markets Act,86 for offences committed
after 3 June 2013. For offences alleged to have taken place prior to 3 June 2013, the
provisions of Chapter VIII87 of the Securities Services Act88 will apply.
Currently, the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act89 is in force,
and has as one of its principal aims the protection of consumers.90
Intermediaries Services Act (FAIS Act), No. 37 of 2002, (Republic of South Africa); Financial
Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, No. 28 of 2001, (Republic of South Africa); Financial Markets
Act, No. 19 of 2012, (enacted: 1 February, 2013), (Republic of South Africa); Financial Services Board
Act, No. 97 of 1990; Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act, No. 37 of 2004, (enacted: 9 February,
2005), (Republic of South Africa); Financial Supervision of the Road Accident Fund Act, No. 8 of
1993, (Republic of South Africa); Friendly Societies Act, No. 25 of 1956, (Republic of South Africa);
Inspection of Financial Institutions Act, No. 80 of 1988, (Republic of South Africa); Long-term
Insurance Act, No. 52 of 1998, (Republic of South Africa); Pension Funds Act, No. 24 of 1956,
(Republic of South Africa); Short-term Insurance Act, No. 53 of 1998, (Republic of South Africa).
81

Financial Services Board, ‘Market Abuse’, in About Us, published by Financial Services Board,

(1996-2013),

accessed:

17

August,

2014,

https://www.fsb.co.za/departments/marketAbuse/Pages/Home.aspx, and created pursuant to s 85 of the
Financial Markets Act, No. 19 of 2012.
82

Prohibited by s 78, Financial Markets Act, No. 19 of 2012.

83

Prohibited by s 80, ibid.

84

Prohibited by s 81, ibid.

85

Sections 77 to 89, ibid.

86

Ibid.

87

Sections 72 to 87, Securities Services Act, No. 36 of 2004, (Republic of South Africa).

88

Ibid.

89

Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, No. 37 of 2002, (Republic of South Africa).

90

Financial Services Board, ‘Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services’, in Regulatory

Examinations, published by Financial Services Board, (1996-2013), accessed: 17 August, 2014,
https://www.fsb.co.za/Departments/fais/Pages/Regulatory-Examinations.aspx. ‘Undesirable Practices’,
s 34 (1), Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, No. 37 of 2002, which states: ‘Subject to
subsections (2) and (3), the registrar may by notice in the Gazette declare a particular business practice
to be undesirable for all or a category of authorised services providers, or any such provider’,
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(subsequently replaced by s 196 (a), Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act, No. 45 of 2013,
(Republic of South Africa), which states: ‘(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the registrar may by
notice in the Gazette declare a particular business practice to be undesirable for all or a category of
authorised services providers, or any such provider.’). S 34 (2), Financial Advisory and Intermediary
Services Act, No. 37 of 2002, which states: ‘(2) The following principles must guide the registrar in
considering whether or not a declaration contemplated in subsection (1) should be made: (a) That the
practice concerned, directly or indirectly, has or is likely to have the effect of – (i) harming the
relations between authorised financial services providers or any category of such providers, or any such
provider, and clients or the general public; (ii) unreasonably prejudicing any client; (iii) deceiving any
client; or (iv) unfairly affecting any client; and (b) that if the practice is allowed to continue, one or
more objects of this Act will or is likely to, be defeated. (3) The registrar may not make such a
declaration unless the registrar has by notice in the Gazette published an intention to make the
declaration, giving reasons therefor [sic], and invited interested persons to make written representations
thereanent so as to reach the registrar within 21 days after the date of publication of that notice. (4) An
authorised financial services provider or representative may not, on or after the date of the publication
of a notice referred to in subsection (1), carry on the business practice concerned.’ (Subsequently
replaced by s 196 (b), Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act, No. 45 of 2013, which states:
‘(4) An authorised financial services provider or representative may not, on or after the date of the
publication of a notice referred to in subsection (1), carry on the business practice concerned.’). S 34
(5), Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, No. 37 of 2002, states: ‘The registrar may
direct an authorised financial services provider who, on or after the date of the publication of a notice
referred to in subsection (1), carries on the business practice concerned in contravention of that notice,
to rectify to the satisfaction of the registrar anything which was caused by or arose out of the carrying
on of the business practice concerned: Provided that the registrar may not make an order contemplated
in section 6D (2)(b) of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, (sic) 2001 (Act No. 28 of
2001).’ (Subsequently replaced by s 60 (a), Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act, No. 22
of 2008, (Republic of South Africa), which states: ‘by the substitution for subsection (5) of the
following subsection: “(5) The registrar may direct an authorised financial services provider who, on or
after the date of the publication of a notice referred to in subsection (1), carries on the business practice
concerned in contravention of that notice, to rectify [or reinstate] to the satisfaction of the registrar [any
loss or damage] anything which was caused by or arose out of the carrying on of the business practice
concerned: Provided that the registrar may not make an order contemplated in section 6D (2)(b) of the
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, 2001 (Act No. 28 of 2001).”;’). S 34 (6), Financial
Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, No. 37 of 2002, which states: ‘An authorised financial
services provider concerned who is under subsection (5) directed to rectify anything, must do so within
60 days after such direction is issued.’ (Subsequently replaced by s 60 (b), Financial Services Laws
General Amendment Act, No. 22 of 2008, which states: ‘by the substitution for subsection (6) of the
following subsection: “(6) An authorised financial services provider concerned who is under subsection
(5) directed to rectify [or reinstate] anything, must do so within 60 days after such direction is
issued.”.’).
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In addition, there are consumer protection provisions which are enforced by
the Office of the Ombud for Financial Services Providers (FAIS Ombud). 91 The
Ombud is a statutory body 92 empowered to deal with complaints against financial
institutions which do not fall within the jurisdiction of any other ombud scheme, or
where there is uncertainty over jurisdiction.
Currently, deposit-taking banks are regulated by the Banking Supervision
Department (BSD) of the SARB.93 In addition, the National Credit Regulator94 has as
its’ objective to promote fairness in accessing consumer credit, consumer protection
and competitiveness in the credit industry.

95

91

The Office of the Ombud for Financial Services Providers, ‘Welcome to FAIS Ombud’, published

by The Office of the Ombud for Financial Services Providers, (2012-2014), accessed: 17 August, 2014,
http://www.faisombud.co.za.
92

Established by the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, No. 37 of 2002. From the 1st

of April 2005, the FAIS Ombud was created as a Statutory Ombud under the Financial Services
Ombud Schemes Act, No. 37 of 2004, giving the entity original jurisdiction.
93

South African Reserve Bank, ‘Bank Supervision’, in Regulation and supervision, published by the

South

African

Reserve

Bank,

(undated),

accessed:

17

August,

2014,

https://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/BankSupervision/Pages/BankSupervisionHome.aspx.
94

National Credit Regulator, ‘About the NCR’, published by National Credit Regulator, (2014),

accessed: 17 August, 2014, http://www.ncr.org.za. A statutory body created by the National Credit Act,
No. 34 of 2005, (Republic of South Africa).
95

D. Rajendaran, supra note 73.
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Against this backdrop the IMF issued its 2008 Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP) Report.96 In respect of financial system regulation, the Report stated
as follows:
‘The financial sector regulatory framework is modern and generally effective.
There is a need to strengthen supervision of conglomerates with a focus on risks
that span more than one sector, and to further promote cooperation, consistency,
and effectiveness among regulators.’97

98

As a result the South African Treasury issued a report on financial sector
regulation,99 aimed at addressing the shortcomings identified by the IMF Report.100
Principally the South African Treasury Report proposed the adoption of a Twin Peaks
model of financial system regulation.101 The Treasury Report stated:
96

S. Kal Wajid, supra note 70.

97

S. Kal Wajid, supra note 70, 1.

98

Ibid., 24.

99

Republic of South Africa National Treasury, supra note 71.

100

S. Kal Wajid, supra note 70.

101

Republic of South Africa National Treasury, supra note 71, 28.
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The twin peaks approach is regarded as the optimal means of ensuring that
transparency, market integrity, and consumer protection receive sufficient
priority, and given South Africa’s historical neglect of market conduct
regulation, a dedicated regulator responsible for consumer protection, and not
automatically presumed to be subservient to prudential concerns, is probably the
most appropriate way to address this issue… the existence of separate prudential
and market conduct regulators may be a way of creating a system of checks and
balances, thereby avoiding the vesting of too much power in the hands of a
single agency… the flip side of creating checks and balances is the need to
carefully define roles and responsibilities to avoid duplication of work and
jurisdictional overlap… separation of prudential and market conduct regulation
does not eliminate the possibility of conflict between them… consultation
between the two bodies would lead to an acceptable compromise. But if not,
some external means would need to be found to reconcile objectives. In South
Africa, the formal way of resolving conflict will be through the Council of
Financial Regulators.102

As a result, the South African Treasury has put forward a draft Financial
Sector Regulation Bill which, as at time of writing, had recently been tabled in South
Africa’s National Parliament.103 The Bill makes provisions for the establishment of a
Twin Peaks system in South Africa, and envisages the creation of a Financial System
Council of Regulators, 104 which will co-ordinate financial regulation; and the

102

Ibid., 28. Pursuant to advice provided by the writer to the South African Treasury in 2015, this has

now be renamed the ‘Financial System, Council of Regulators’. National Treasury, Republic of South
Africa, ‘Financial Sector Regulation Bill, Comments Received on the Second Draft Bill Published by
National Treasury for Comments on 11 December 2014 (Comment Period from 11 December 2014 02 March 2015)’, National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, (2015), 120. See also Chap. 5, Part 2, s
79 (1), Financial Sector Regulation Bill (2nd Draft), (21 August 2015), (Republic of South Africa).
103

Tabled Bill no. B34-2015, (27 October, 2015). National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, ‘Media

statement: Tabling of Financial Sector Regulation Bill to give effect to Twin Peaks reform’, published
by National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, Pretoria, ZA, (27 October, 2015).
104

S 79, Financial Sector Regulation Bill (2nd Draft), (21 August 2015), which states: ‘The Financial

System Council of Regulators is hereby established. (2) The objective of the Financial System Council
of Regulators is to facilitate co-operation and collaboration, and, where appropriate, consistency of
action, between the institutions represented on the Financial System Council of Regulators by
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Financial Stability Oversight Committee,105 which will co-ordinate financial stability
issues, and endeavour to mitigate risks to the financial system.

III

AN ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT

METHODOLOGY IN AUSTRALIA

This part provides an analysis of risk-based financial regulation, and its close
cousins,106 principles-based and outcomes-focused regulation. Because these are terms
of art, not science, they cannot be defined, or indeed even separated, precisely. They
do, however, share methodological and philosophical characteristics, which bear
investigating.

What lies under the labels is an agglomeration of regulatory styles and
approaches, some of which are exhibited by some regulators, but not all of
which are exhibited by all. … a rough guide to a roughly drawn regulatory
world and how it has evolved.107

Put simply, the hierarchy may be understood as follows: Risk-based
regulations are the tactics for addressing the strategy provided by outcomes-focused
regulation: risk-based regulation is focused on outcomes, and has, therefore, a natural
affinity with, and folds into, an outcomes-focused paradigm. 108 Outcomes-focused
strategies, in turn, address the grand strategy outlined by principles-based regulation.

A. Risk-based approach

providing a forum for senior representatives of those institutions to discuss, and inform themselves
about, matters of common interest.’
105

S 5, Financial Sector Regulation Bill, (11 December, 2013), (Republic of South Africa).

106

J. Black, ‘OFR: the historical context’, Chap. 2, in Outcomes-Focused Regulation, A Practical

Guide, edited by A. Hopper QC & G. Treverton-Jones QC, in ‘Legal Handbooks’, Law Society
Publishing, (2011), 7/8.
107

Ibid., 8.

108

Ibid., 15.
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If in Australia Twin Peaks is the regulatory architecture, then the risk-based model109
as used by APRA is the plumbing.
… at APRA, we have always been strong proponents of risk-based supervision.
It’s inherent in our mission and values, and it’s ingrained in our supervisory
approach. It’s in our DNA. For us, risk-based supervision is religion.110

While risk-based models of enforcement are not exclusive to Twin Peaks,
some would argue that a risk-based model of enforcement is a natural adjunct to Twin
Peaks. Put differently, you need not have Twin Peaks to use a risk-based model, but
you may need a risk-based model to use Twin Peaks. This due to the fact that the
safety and soundness regulator is, by its nature, concerned with combatting systemic
risk.
Risk-based prudential regulation focuses on activities that pose the greatest
risk to the regulators’ statutory obligations, as well as other, key goals. 111 This
approach has been adopted in the UK, the Netherlands, Canada, the United States,
Hong Kong, Ireland, is recommended by the 2012 standards of the OECD’s Financial
Action Task Force, and is proposed for adoption by the Joint Committee of European
Supervisory Authorities.112 It is the method preferred by the World Bank, the IMF and
the Basel Committee.113

As such, [this risk-based] approach is predicated on outcomes and thus has a
natural affinity to [Outcomes Focused Regulation]: where conduct breaches a
rule but does not have a substantive impact on, for example, consumer

109

Ibid., 9. For a history of risk-based financial regulation, see: J. Black, supra note 60, 261. For a

history of the development of different philosophical approaches to regulation, see: J. Black, supra
note 106, 8ff.
110

D. Lewis, ‘Risk-Based Supervision: How Can We Do Better? An Australian Supervisory

Perspective’, Paper presented at the Toronto Centre Program on Supervisory Experiences in
Implementing Global Banking Reforms, Toronto, Toronto, CA, edited by Toronto Centre, Global
Leadership in Financial Supervision, (19 June 2013), 1.
111

J. Black, supra note 106, 9.

112

J. Black, supra note 60, 261ff.

113

J. Black, supra note 60, 265.
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protection, the regulator will not act, or at least will not treat the issue as a
matter of priority… a focus [therefore] on risks not rules.114

Risk-based supervision is now seen as the hallmark of good regulation at the
global level. … IOSCO … recommends to supervisors that they take a ‘riskbased approach’[

115

]. The revised Basel Core Principles for Banking

Supervision issued in 2012 require supervisors to adopt effective risk-based
systems[116] … The Financial Stability Board (FSB)’s recommendations[117] for
the supervision of globally systemic financial institutions (GSIFIs) echoes the
call for a risk-based approach.118

There are a number of advantages to a risk-based approach.119 Most notably
there is an acknowledgement that in a rules-based paradigm of financial system
regulation, regulators are often over-burdened by rules – rules which cannot be
enforced in every firm, for every transaction, on every occasion. Selecting what to
prioritise is, therefore, necessary and, according to Black120 ‘[t]hese selections have
always been made, but risk-based frameworks both render the fact of selection
explicit and provide a framework of analysis in which they can be made.’

114

J. Black, supra note 106, 9.

115

See: The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), ‘Guidelines to Emerging

Market Regulators Regarding Requirements for Minimum Entry and Continuous Risk-Based
Supervision of Market Intermediaries, Final Report’, The International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), (December, 2009), 9ff.
116

See: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Core Principles for Effective Banking

Supervision’, Bank for International Settlements, (September, 2012), 4, (§ 12).
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See: Financial Stability Board, ‘Increasing the Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision’, in

Progress Report to the G20 Ministers and Governors, Financial Stability Board, (1 November, 2012),
7.
118

J. Black, supra note 60, 264.
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See: B. Carruthers, ‘“Objectives Based Regulation:” buzzword du jour?’, Out of the Crooked

Timber of Humanity, No Straight Thing Was Ever Made, Blog, (2 April, 2008), accessed: 22 July,
2015, http://crookedtimber.org/2008/04/02/“objectives-based-regulation”-buzzword-du-jour/.
120

J. Black, supra note 106, 9.
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… pick important problems and fix them.121

But pragmatic as this approach may sound, it leads to several unintended
consequences which, in turn, undermine the overall efficacy of this regulatory
paradigm. These include:


the assumption that regulators are smart enough to ‘foresee the
unforeseeable’.122 Put differently, there is an assumption that regulators will
know from where the next financial crisis will come and, consequently,
correctly identify which types of risks and what forms of conduct to prioritise.
But, as was seen during the GFC, this assumption is not always correct:
… indeed with respect to the global financial crisis more broadly, assumptions
that had been made as to how markets would react in particular scenarios
proved significantly misplaced, with risk events that had been anticipated to
occur once in several lives of the universe … occurring every day.123



the model itself may incorrectly prioritise which risks to avoid, as distinct
from a failure to identify the risk at all, and this was evident from the
conclusions reached in the aftermath of the failure of HIH;124



there exists the potential for process-induced myopia. That is to say, a focus
on the process upon which risk-based regulation relies, without paying
sufficient attention to issues that are outside the scope of what is covered by
the process.

If little scope is given in practice for those engaged in working within the
framework to work outside it where they see the need, the framework will always
be prey to events that those working within it were not given the room to say they
had seen.125
121

M. K. Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems, and Managing

Compliance, Council for Excellence in Government, (2000), Brookings Institution Press, 9.
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What Black refers to as ‘blind spots’. J. Black, supra note 34, 23.
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no. 24/2014, London School of Economics and Political Science, (2014), 14.
124

J. Black, supra note 34, 23.
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To this end anecdotal evidence suggests that criticism of APRA, and
challenges to the organisation’s prevailing orthodoxies, are in danger of being
met with hostility;126


there is, as a consequence, a lack of predictive certainty for the regulatees, as
to what forms of conduct will be sanctioned and what forms not;



this in turn encourages a capricious regulatory environment, particularly
where different individuals in the regulators take different approaches, or
have different priorities;



an unpredictable regulatory environment, brought about by changes in the
prevailing political climate;127



the potential for regulatees to encourage regulatory forbearance, by either
arguing that the proposed sanctions pose a greater risk to the regulated entity,
and therefore the entire financial system, than the misconduct itself;128 or



the potential for regulatees to encourage forbearance by arguing that similar
conduct was expressly authorised by the regulator in the past, (constituting, as
it did then, an acceptable risk);



what Llewellyn 129 refers to as the ‘Christmas tree effect’, 130 in which the
regulator’s remit steadily increases – as perceptions of risk increase - with a
wide array of ancillary functions, both to the point of over-burden and to the
point of distraction from what should be core activities;



perceptions of risk are exactly that: perceptions. While APRA has attempted
to create a methodology around the assessment of risk, and to lessen the

126

This anecdotal evidence is based upon the writer’s tenure at APRA in late 2013, and informal

discussions with colleagues.
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See: J. Black, supra note 106, 10. See also: J. Black, supra note 34, 24ff, where she asserts that

politically, a failing bank, which may be acceptable to the regulator, may be unacceptable to those in
the community who stand to lose their deposits. To this can be added political pressure from bank
owners for the bank to be rescued, despite the regulator’s willingness to allow the bank to fail.
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C. Binham & J. Guthrie, ‘FCA: On the wrong side of the argument?’, Financial Times, (2 July,

2015, 7:29 pm).
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D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24, 23.
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European Experience,’ in Policy Research Working Paper, no. 2223, The World Bank, (September,
1999), 13, (§ 2.24).
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impact upon the assessment of risk of individual perceptions, risk assessment
is not and never will be as ‘“rational” [or] as consistent in substance as its
form suggests.’131

B. Outcomes-focused regulation

The risk-based approach followed by the Australian prudential regulator falls easily
within a ‘regulation by objective’132 paradigm; that is to say a paradigm the purpose of
which is to ‘[achieve] particular and concrete outcomes’.133 This paradigm enjoys a
number of advantages. These include:


regulators can be more effective, with each having clear objectives
(outcomes) that do not overlap;



regulators can, as a result, be more accountable and more focused 134 on
achieving those outcomes;



it creates checks and balances between agencies, and their objectives;135



it allows each regulator to create its own culture that best suits its objectives;
and



it allows each regulator to acquire expertise specifically required to meet its
objectives.136
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Paulson Jr., R. K. Steel, D. G. Nason, K. Ayers, H. Etner, J. Foley III, G. Hughes, T. Hunt, K. Jaconi,
C. Klingman, C. C. Ledoux, P. Nickoloff, J. Norton, P. Quinn, H. Schultheiss, M. Scott, J. Stoltzfoos,
M. Ugoletti & R. Woodall, ‘The Department of The Treasury Blueprint For A Modernized Financial
Regulatory Structure’, The Department of The Treasury, (March, 2008).
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See also: D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24, 26.
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As with a risk-based paradigm, so too an outcomes-focused approach has its
shortcomings. These relate to the manner in which objectives are identified and
prioritised. As with a risk-based approach the danger remains that the regulator may
identify the wrong objectives; or may initially identify the correct objectives, but fail
to adjust those in light of changed circumstances; or may find itself captured by
industry with a concomitant contamination of its objectives; or become suborned by
political masters, in which the regulator’s objectives are once again contaminated. Put
differently, with flexibility in priorities come opportunities for a more nuanced
approach to combatting whatever problem the regulator is charged with preventing;
but so too with flexibility come the pitfalls that arise wherever regulator’s are invested
with discretion.137

C. Principles-based regulation
Both these approaches - objectives-based regulation and risk-based regulation – have
as their over-arching paradigm principles-based regulation, in that neither focus on
systems and processes, but on principles-based outcomes. Principles-based regulation,
as an over-arching paradigm too, has its deficiencies. A principles based model setsforth broad principles to be followed, as opposed to prescriptive, inflexible rules
governing specific activities, and requiring minimum standards of conduct.
…means moving away from reliance on detailed, prescriptive rules and relying
more on high-level, broadly stated rules or principles to set the standards by
which regulated firms must conduct business. The term ‘principles’ can be used
simply to refer to general rules, or also to suggest that these rules are implicitly
higher in the implicit or explicit hierarchy of norms than more detailed rules:
they express the fundamental obligations that all should observe.138

137

Indeed A. Demirgüç-Kunt & E. Detragiache, ‘Basel Core Principles and Bank Soundness, Does

Compliance Matter?’, in Policy Research Working Paper, no. WPS5129, The World Bank,
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So regulators, instead of focussing on prescribing the processes or actions that
firms must take, should step back and define the outcomes that they require firms
to achieve. Firms and their management will then be free to find the most
efficient way of achieving the outcome required.139

In 2008 the Australian Law Reform Commission Report into privacy put forth
the following statement by Curtis to explain the advantages of a principles based
regulatory regime:

By encouraging organisations to recognise the business advantages of
[compliance] and regulating their behaviour accordingly … regulatory
approach where a legislative framework is balanced by an emphasis on … selfregulation … inculcate the values and objectives … rather than just the
superficial rules. … organisations … will understand the ideas behind the laws—
the principles—and will not become as confused by detailed … regulations.140

These sentiments, expressed in respect of privacy regulations, have been
expressed in similar vein to support the supposed advantages of a principles based
regulatory regime, for the financial system.141 There is, however, a difference between
information privacy regulations and financial system regulations, and one so crucial
that it undermines the supposed advantages of the principles based model: financial

Supreme Courthouse (Banco Court), Sydney, NSW, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of
Sydney, (Wednesday 28th March 2007), 3.
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system regulations almost always contain an opportunity cost to the regulatee, in
addition to the mere compliance cost.142 Put differently, in the financial system the
costs of full regulatory compliance are potentially significantly higher, 143 and the
degree of convenience to the bank for non-compliance significantly greater.144 In this
regard it is questionable whether Black is correct when she asserts that: ‘[r]egulatees
have to take more responsibility for ensuring that they are achieving the right
outcomes, not just going through the right processes’145 as this does not adequately
take account of the compulsions, inherent in financial regulation, for regulatees to
constantly look for ways to lessen the impact of the regulations to which they ought to
adhere; not just including, but especially in respect of outcomes.
Add to this the heady mixture created by a regulatory paradigm that is more
one of managing conduct than enforcing discipline, 146 located within an overall
strategy that seeks, at least initially, to be co-operative and collegial, as opposed to
confrontational, 147 and seeks by negotiated settlement to define outcomes more
142
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general than specific, and it is no wonder that goals shift and outcomes become
malleable.

A principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have no
principles.148

Indeed, one could argue that if it is outcomes that are set as benchmarks, as
opposed to processes,149 then all that is required in order to encourage regulators to
forebear, is to re-negotiate the outcomes. A clearer and more straightforward
objective than re-negotiating a myriad of complex processes.
A further important factor determining the efficacy of regulators is the
political climate in which they operate. 150 This will affect the robustness of
enforcement, and it may extend to the vigour with which principles are at first
determined, and later adjusted. The degree to which the United States’ Congress is
beholden to Wall Street, 151 and the pushback against the FSA 152 in the UK are
instructive in this respect.
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And fashions, even in regulation, change. In the UK, Antony Jenkins, the patron
saint of conduct risk, has just been unceremoniously dumped as CEO of
Barclays Bank, ostensibly for concentrating on managing the bank’s toxic
conduct rather than making profits. The conduct risk pendulum may already be
beginning to swing back and the current fashion for piousness may be fading.153

At first glance, Wall Street’s ability to block Dodd–Frank’s implementation
seems surprising. After all, public outrage over Wall Street’s role in the global
financial crisis impelled Congress to pass Dodd–Frank in 2010 despite the
financial industry’s intense opposition. Moreover, scandals at systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs) have continued to tarnish Wall Street’s
reputation since Dodd– Frank’s enactment. However, as the general public’s
focus on the financial crisis has waned—due in large part to massive
governmental support that saved Wall Street—the momentum for meaningful
financial reform has faded.154

Similarly, in Australia there are examples of what in the UK came to be know
as the ‘light touch’.155 For example the regulators follow policies set-forth under Basel
II in which banks are permitted to determine their own internal risk ratings.156 Put
differently, IRB157 models, as they are known, permit a bank to determine whether it
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is complying with overall prudential principles. A model which gives rise to a
dangerous conflict of interest,158 and one that is now being dismantled.159
So while risk-based supervision, within a framework of outcomes-focused and
principles-based regulatory strategies has advantages – especially as regards the
prioritising of risks in an environment where risks and potential risks are potentially
limitless – they are nonetheless vulnerable to institutional inadequacies, incorrect
priorities, political interference, industry pressure and a failure to foresee the
unforeseeable. They lead to a capricious and an unpredictable regulatory environment
in which priorities are malleable, and in which regulators are susceptible to capture.160

IV

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH AFRICA, DIFFERENCES AND

SIMILARITIES

The most noticeable difference between the Australian approach and the proposed
South African model, is that the Australian Prudential Regulator is an independent
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entity,161 whereas the South African proposal is for the Prudential Authority to be a
division of the South African Reserve Bank,162 albeit as a separate juristic person.163
While the Australian model provides a high degree of statutory independence
to the system stability regulator, 164 APRA, it is to a degree answerable to the
Treasurer, 165 and both APRA 166 and ASIC 167 to the Federal Parliament by way of
submission of Annual Reports. Taylor envisages either Ministerial oversight or
Parliamentary oversight

168

in his model. The South African Bill envisages

accountability to the National Treasury (and ultimately Parliament) through the
Financial Stability Oversight Committee169 and the annual reporting requirements.170
Consequently, this comports with Taylor’s original recommendation, 171 which he
claims is more likely to negate the politicisation of the regulator, than would an
arrangement that requires the regulator to be responsible only to Parliament. The
internal logic of this argument is, however, difficult to discern. It could just as easily
161
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be argued that responsibility to Parliament may ameliorate pressure from the
Treasury, and may serve to countervail the possibility of regulatory capture.
While there is no definitive answer to the question of whether it is better to
locate the prudential regulator within the NCB, or outside, the balance of probabilities
favours the latter.172

V CONCLUSION

If South Africa continues to develop, and succeeds in lifting more South Africans out
of poverty, ever greater calls will be made on the private sector to provide a wide
variety of savings and investment products, and self-funded social insurance. An
agency dedicated to market conduct and consumer protection will, therefore, become
ever more necessary.
A bifurcated system, it is argued, is preferable. One entity will be responsible
for system stability, including ongoing prudential regulatory enforcement and
development, of all financially significant firms, including banks, insurers or a
combination of the two, on a single and consolidated basis. This will prove even more
important in the future, as the lines between banks, merchant banks and insurers
continues to be blurred, and as the scale of interconnectedness between financial firms
continues apace, particularly in the OTC173 derivatives market, in which banks and
securities firms are the primary dealers. The size of the OTC market, the global
notional value of which was a staggering US$ 710 trillion as at December 2013,174
represents the clearest indication of the potential for interconnectedness, and poses a
significant threat to any financial system through contagion, both endogenous and
exogenous. Only a whole of entity, consolidated group approach can hope to address
this interconnectedness. So, while South Africa came through the GFC relatively
unscathed, due mainly to the conservative nature of its banking system, 175 the
172
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experience gained from the GFC was that increasingly esoteric products, created by
securities firms beyond the purview of institutional or functional regulators, created a
blind spot for regulators in the USA and Europe; 176 one that ultimately had
catastrophic economic consequences.
The second entity will be responsible for market conduct and consumer
protection. It is argued such a system would more likely to resolve fragmentation,
provide clarity of ambit, be more cost-effective due to rulebook simplification, and
improve accountability – more likely, but not definitely, as the recent failings of ASIC
in Australia have demonstrated. 177 If the consumer protection and market conduct
regulator does prove effective, then advantages accrue to consumers for a ‘one-stop
shop’178 for complaints against regulated firms.
Ultimately, of course, the success of a Twin Peaks regime in South Africa will
depend upon the efficacy of enforcement – governance – and this in turn will depend
upon the goals that are set – the principles – and on how those goals are pursued. That
in turn will depend upon market intelligence – the risks – along with the
independence and the capacity of the regulators to pursue corrective action, free of
interference or industry capture; co-ordination between the peaks; the resources –
physical and human – which the regulators bring to bear, and their willingness, if
need be, to take on vested and powerful interests.
If successful, Twin Peaks will help lay the foundations for a dynamic financial
sector, one that already plays a significant role - an excessive role according to
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some179 - in South Africa’s economy. If Twin Peaks fails, and fails under the wrong
circumstances, such as another global financial crisis, the results will be catastrophic.
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